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I.   INTRODUCTION
“She brought a small town to its feet and a huge company to its knees.”
1
 This is the tagline of the blockbuster movie Erin Brockovich, a 
true story of how a single mother recovered an enormous settlement 
on behalf of a victimized rural town. It portrays the conventional 
view that class action lawsuits frequently pit the successful underdog 
against the powerful and greedy corporation.  
 However, the history and development of class action litigation in 
the United States has been much less idealistic and straightforward. 
There has been an enormous amount of debate regarding reform for 
both the allegedly underdog plaintiffs and the mighty corporations. 
These discussions have resulted in the passage of several pieces of 
legislation. The most recent was the culmination of much legislative 
debate, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). 

∗  J.D. 2011, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. 2006, University of 
Georgia. I am grateful to my parents for all of their love and support throughout the years, 
and to Professor Tara Grove for her insightful input and teaching me that statutory 
interpretation can, in fact, be a very interesting topic. Thank you also to all of my friends, 
including Lauren Morrissette for her many pearls of “wisdom”; my mentor, John Marino; 
and the editors of Florida State University Law Review.
 1. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000). 
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On February 18, 2005, the 109th Congress passed CAFA, and it 
was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.
2
 The nearly 
immediate result was a broad overhaul of the manner in which class 
action lawsuits are litigated and resolved. The primary changes 
included the following: (1) increased judicial scrutiny of proposed 
“coupon settlements” and notice provided to litigants, (2) the 
significant expansion of diversity jurisdiction, (3) jurisdictional 
exceptions for when a federal district court must and may refuse to 
accept a class action case, (4) appellate procedures for dealing with 
remand orders, and (5) the implementation of a monitoring system to 
be put in place to hold practitioners and the judiciary accountable for 
its disposition of class action lawsuits.  
 These changes have had, and will continue to have, an enormous 
impact on the field of class action litigation. They have evoked mixed 
reactions from practitioners, academic commentators, and the 
judiciary. When Congress initially began to consider a proper vehicle 
for reform, the foremost concerns involved the need to alleviate the 
abusive practices of plaintiffs’ attorneys receiving excessive fees and 
ensure that more adequate representation would be provided to class 
members.
3
 However, that focus began to shift as discussions 
progressed and the focus turned to “forum shopping.”
4
 This practice 
occurs when class members seek the most promising state court 
forum and attempt to avoid the federal forum by adding diversity-
destroying parties or bringing claims where individual class member 
damages are below the threshold required for diversity jurisdiction.
5
The Senate Judiciary Report noted that this practice results in the 
inconsistent treatment of similar litigation, which frequently 
contravenes basic fairness and due process considerations.
6
 Others 
have expressed additional concerns as to whether a shift from 
individual lawsuits to a group pursuit of justice tends to deprive a 
litigant of having his well-established “day in court.”
7
 These abusive practices did not just emerge in recent years. 
Moreover, the large settlements or jury verdicts achieved by class 
plaintiffs have adversely affected consumers because the expense is 
eventually passed on in the form of rising costs. These rising costs 

 2. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (2006). Courts have 
consistently upheld the February 18, 2005 effective date. See, e.g., Bush v. Cheaptickets, 
Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(10th Cir. 2005); Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 3. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594-95 (2006). 
 4. Id. at 1595. 
 5. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and 
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1854 (2008). 
 6. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29-30 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28-29). 
 7. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989). 
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have played a major role in the significant amount of public 
discontent, along with a general distrust for the legal system, which 
has continued to proliferate and resulted in attempts at reform by 
previous legislatures.
8
 The Senate Judiciary Committee has conducted hearings focused 
on similar legislation since the late 1990s. In 2003, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 was amended to reflect CAFA’s focus on 
reforming the class action process.  The amendments dealt with four 
main areas: (1) the timeline for certification decisions and notice, (2) 
judicial oversight of class action settlements, (3) the appointment of 
class counsel, and (4) the compensation structure for class counsel.
9
Although the amendments to FRCP 23 were noted as progress in the 
right direction, further reform was needed.  
 In 2001 and again in 2003, legislation for a Class Action Fairness 
Act was proposed, but both failed to receive adequate votes in the 
House and Senate to become law.
10
 Both versions had attempted to 
implement the following changes, most of which were later 
incorporated into CAFA: the establishment of a consumer class 
action bill of rights dealing with settlements and compensation for 
class counsel, the expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction over any 
civil action in which the aggregate amount of the claims exceeds $2 
million, the abrogation of the requirement for complete diversity 
between the class members and all defendants, and provisions for 
carve-outs from federal jurisdiction for local controversies.
11
 CAFA is the culmination of ongoing reform efforts and legislative 
debates. It addresses the many criticisms of the class action process 
as it existed prior to its passage. However, there has been 
controversy surrounding the interpretation and application of specific 
portions of CAFA. The controversy is largely the result of alleged 
disparities between the plain language of CAFA and the legislative 
history supporting it.  
 To date, there have already been a number of cases dealing with 
these disparities and the effect they have had on the application of 
the new procedures. These cases have, in some situations, resulted in 
inconsistent treatment by various courts, which is in direct 

 8. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 2083 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 1998
(1998), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s105-2083; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.
353 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2000 (2000), http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-2062. 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h). 
 10. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1712 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2001
(2001), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-1712&tab=summary; see also 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1751 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003 (2003), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-1751&tab=summary. 
 11. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 1712 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2001
(2001), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-1712&tab=summary. 
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contradiction with the stated purpose of CAFA “to assure fair and 
prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims.”
12
 Only 
time will tell whether there will be a need for the United States 
Supreme Court to interpret the key provisions that are providing so 
much room for interpretation, or if Congress will be able to 
adequately intervene by passing corrective legislative measures. 
 This Note discusses the dispute between two schools of statutory 
interpretation as they apply to CAFA: textualists, who adhere to the 
plain language of CAFA, and purposivists, who consult the legislative 
history in order to ascertain Congress’s intent and purpose to resolve 
any ambiguous provisions. Part II provides a history of class action 
litigation and a brief description of previous attempts at mass tort 
reform. Part III provides an overview of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005. Part IV discusses a few primary ambiguous provisions 
and how they have been handled by courts since CAFA’s enactment 
in 2005, including a discussion of the textualist and purposivist 
perspectives. Part V concludes by recommending that, in order to 
reconcile the purposes of CAFA and the underlying sentiments 
expressed in legislative materials, courts should adopt a textual 
approach when interpreting CAFA and allow Congress to enact 
corrective legislation to resolve any significant ambiguities. 
II.   THE HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A.   Becoming a Massively Powerful Tool for Litigators 
 Although class action litigation began in common law England as 
representative lawsuits, it was not until the 1800s that this method 
became available to litigants in the United States.
13
 The first federal 
group litigation provision, Equity Rule 48, was passed in 1842 and 
served as an exception to the compulsory joinder rule that had been 
imported from England.
14
 It has been noted that fundamental 
changes occurred when Federal Equity Rule 38 succeeded Equity 
Rule 48 in 1912, because representative suits were then permitted 
when there were simply too many parties to join and absent parties 
could finally be bound by the final judgment.
15
 The twentieth century ushered in an era of massive procedural 
reform in American law. Class actions were one device in particular 
need of improvement. A leading legal scholar of that time, Zechariah 

 12. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30. 
 13. 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:9 
(4th ed. 2002). 
 14. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest, 
Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1091 (1980); CONTE & NEWBERG, supra 
note 13, § 1:9.
 15. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig, 129 B.R. 710, 804 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. & 
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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Chafee, helped bring this issue to the forefront after publishing an 
essay that advocated for class actions as a judicially economical tool 
that required further reform.
16
 However, Chafee went on to 
formulate a fundamental question: “whether the mere existence of 
multiple parties with parallel legal claims or defenses was sufficient 
to create equitable jurisdiction, or whether an additional, independent 
equitable factor (such as prayers for injunction or for the rescission 
or cancellation of instruments) was necessary.”
17
 Chafee completed a 
thorough analysis that began with the occurrence of bills of peace 
being used to settle disputes between tenants and lords along with 
parishioners and vicars, before concluding that “[f]rom such a bill of 
peace it was a natural step to the representative suit.”
18
 In order to 
take into account the focus on judicial economy while balancing the 
growing concern for litigants’ autonomy, the drafters of FRCP 23 
permitted (but neither required nor motivated) individual members 
of the class to organize.
19
 The initial version of FRCP 23 was significantly similar to the 
former Equity Rule 38 and attempted to categorize class suits in 
terms of jural relations between parties.
20
 The 1938 version of FRCP 
23 had three designations for class suits.
21
 The first two designations, 
true and hybrid, were considered narrow and required a “joint” or 
“common” interest, or a “several” interest in a specific property, 
respectively.
22
 The third, which was known as the spurious action, 
had a far broader reach and required only a common question of law 
or fact and common relief.
23
 The primary focus was that there had to 
be a notion of privity or unified interest between the parties making 
the claim.
24
 Professor Moore, who was a principal drafter of the original Rule 
23, helped clarify the extent to which the judgment was binding on 
the parties because the preliminary draft of the rule itself was silent 
on the issue.
25
 A sliding scale of binding effect was proposed and 

 16. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1297 (1932). 
 17.  Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1099 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS 
OF EQUITY 156 (1950)). 
 18. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the 
Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 868 (1977) (quoting CHAFEE, supra note 17, at 200-01). 
 19. Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1102. 
 20. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:9. 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (repealed 1966); see also James E. 
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action—Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REV.
407, 463 (1969). 
 22. See Starrs, supra note 21, at 463 & n.348 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)). 
 23. Starrs, supra note 21, at 464.  
 24. Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 615 (1971). 
 25. See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by 
the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937). 
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widely accepted by most courts: the judgment would bind all 
members of a true class action and all appearing parties, and would 
be conclusive as to all claims concerning the property in a hybrid 
class action, and bind only the appearing parties in a spurious class 
action.
26
 Numerous difficulties arose as courts attempted to fit class 
action lawsuits within one of these categories, and many parties 
disputed the judgment’s binding effect. As a result, FRCP 23 was 
completely rewritten when it was amended in 1966.
27
 After the 1966 amendments, FRCP 23 set forth more practical 
requirements for when a class action may be initiated and eliminated 
the concept of a jural relationship.
28
 The four preliminary 
requirements for certification that apply to all class actions are 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.
29
Subsection (b) added further requirements based on functional 
distinctions, such as the relief sought or whether all necessary 
interests would be represented without aggregating the claims.
30
 The 
provision that provided the most resounding change was clearly 
subdivision (b)(3). It provided that a class action may be brought 
when the prerequisites of Subsection (a) are met, the court 
determines that questions of law or fact common to members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and a class action is superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
31
 That version of FRCP 23 drastically changed the playing field and 
was the source of a dramatic increase in class action litigation that 
began in 1966.
32
 No longer were parties required to be connected by 
united interest or privity so long as there was a common factual or 
legal issue. This new rule allowed completely unassociated people to 
come together and make a claim that resulted in a case of 
considerable stature.
33
 The most powerful element of the amended 
rule was that judgments had a binding effect on all class members 
rather than being limited to those who actually participated directly 
in the litigation.
34
 Furthermore, this new device benefitted plaintiffs 
because litigation of relatively minor claims “afford[ed] aggrieved 
persons a remedy when it [was] not economically feasible to obtain 

 26. See id.
 27. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:9. 
 28. Id. § 1:10. 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 30. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1. 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also generally CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:10. 
 32. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of 
the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 401 (2004). 
 33. Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the 
National Debate About “Class Action Fairness”, 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1315-17 (2005). 
 34. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 1:10. 
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relief through the traditional framework of multiple individual 
damage actions as, for example, when each claim involve[d] only a 
small dollar amount.”
35
B.   Procedural Questions Arise as Class Actions Proliferate 
 Although class actions were originally intended for civil rights 
litigants to use in combating segregation, courts transitioned from 
hostility and skepticism to greater acceptance for certifying classes 
with claims that were well outside that initial scope.
36
 The 1966 
amendments to FRCP Rule 23 were largely to blame for the 
increased amount of large, multistate class action cases, which grew 
out of the amendments’ innovative and expanded version of class 
actions based on “ ‘common issues’ of law and fact.”
37
 However, the 
Supreme Court handed down three decisions in the 1970s that 
deterred these cases from being filed in federal court and, in fact, 
made it very difficult for these cases to be litigated in federal  
court at all.
38
 The first case interpreted the federal diversity statute to require 
complete diversity, meaning no class member could be the resident of 
a state in which any defendant, whether an individual or corporate 
entity, resides. Every class member had to meet the statutory 
jurisdictional amount,
39
 which is currently $75,000.
40
 Soon after, the 
Court held that FRCP 23(c)(2) required individual notice to class 
members in a FRCP 23(b)(3) damages claim and that during the 
litigation, the plaintiff must bear the exorbitant cost of providing 
such notice.
41
 Finally, the Court found that the “final decision” 
statute governing appellate jurisdiction did not permit interlocutory 
review of class certification decisions,
42
 which resulted in remand 
decisions having to wait until after final disposition before they could 
be reconsidered. Those three decisions essentially closed the federal 
courthouse doors to most class action lawsuits. 
 Although the doors to the federal courthouse had effectively closed 
to a great majority of class actions, the doors to the state courts did 
not readily swing open. Many state courts questioned whether they 
could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs 

 35. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02 (Daniel R. 
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (citing cases). 
 36. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7. 
 37. Purcell, supra note 5, at 1851 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
 38. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1318.  
 39. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (citing Steele v. Guar. Trust Co. 
of N.Y., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947)). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (2006). 
 41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 177 n.14 (1974). 
 42. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1978). 
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in a multistate lawsuit.
43
 Other state courts were skeptical as to 
whether they had the authority and ability to decide cases that 
involved nonlocal claims.
44
 The Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, provided an answer to both questions posed by state 
courts and ultimately encouraged filings in state court.
45
 This case 
held that a state court does not violate due process regardless of 
whether minimum contacts exist when it asserts personal 
jurisdiction over absent members of a Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class so 
long as absent members have been given an opt-out notice.
46
 The 
Court went on to hold that there is a lesser burden on a plaintiff to 
travel to an out-of-state venue than on a defendant, especially when 
the plaintiff already has adequate representation provided by the 
class counsel.
47
 The Court also held that a state court has the 
authority to exercise its discretion in a choice of law decision so long 
as the choice is “ ‘neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’ ”
48
 An 
important element in the fairness analysis is whether the parties had 
an expectation that they would be governed by the choice of law.
49
 Then, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Court increased the appeal 
of state forums even further by refusing to review a choice of law 
decision in a multistate class action on the basis that the other 
potentially relevant state laws were sufficiently similar to those of 
the forum.
50
 Therefore, state courts had been granted the 
discretionary authority to further their traditional tendency to be 
plaintiff-friendly forums, and plaintiffs frequently exploited 
this opportunity. 
 During this same time, federal courts consistently refused to 
certify class action lawsuits based on mass tort claims, primarily 
because the drafters of the 1966 amendment stated “that mass 
accident cases ‘ordinarily are not appropriate’ for class action 
treatment.”
51
 However, in light of the need for greater judicial 
efficiency, federal courts eventually began to look beyond that 
comment and consider certifying mass tort claims.
52
 Federal courts 
began to grant class certification for a multitude of mass tort claims, 
including cases involving asbestos-related claims, tobacco-related 
illnesses, complications that resulted from faulty silicone implants, 

 43. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1320.   
 44. Id.
 45. 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985). 
 46. Id. at 812.
 47. See id. at 808, 811. 
 48. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). 
 49. Id. at 822.
 50. See 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988). 
 51. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1325 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note). 
 52. Id. at 1325.  
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and alleged pharmaceutical drug contaminations.
53
 This effort was 
effectively thwarted by the availability of the opt-out provision in 
Rule 23(b)(3) and its increased use by defendants.
54
 The opt-out 
provision allows  
[a]n unnamed member who feels it cannot be adequately 
represented by named defendants or by counsel for unnamed 
defendants [to] have the opportunity to “opt out” of the suit and 
not be bound by the judgment or to be represented by a lawyer of 
his own choice. The opportunity for exclusion is adequate 
protection for whatever due process rights are not satisfied by 
actual notice and representation by the named defendant or by 
counsel for unnamed defendants.
55
This provision ensured that parties who may be responsible for a 
considerable portion of the loss suffered by the class members were 
able to effectively insulate themselves from monetary liability, thus 
undermining a large portion of a potential settlement or verdict. 
 As a result, plaintiffs again took up the practice of forum-shopping 
to bring their claims in increasingly plaintiff-friendly state forums.
56
Multistate class actions gave state courts a great amount of power to 
decide issues of national importance that would significantly affect a 
distinctly federal issue: interstate commerce.
57
 This concern was 
declared “ ‘false federalism’ ” by CAFA supporters and mentioned 
throughout the Senate and House reports in the development of 
CAFA.
58
 However, an opposing point of view was expressed in Sun 
Oil Co. v. Wortman when the Court stated,  
[t]o constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or 
the Due Process Clause, it is not enough that a state court 
misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our cases make 
plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other 
State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the 
court’s attention.
59
 The Supreme Court decisions encouraged ambivalence towards 
defendants’ constitutional right to due process.  These decisions also 
furthered a growing problem: a lack of communication and control 

 53. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344 & n.2 (1995). 
 54. Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of 
Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 94 (1997). 
 55. Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance–United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140 
(7th Cir. 1974). 
 56. Glenn A. Danas, Comment, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: 
Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1320-26 (2000). 
 57. Purcell, supra note 5, at 1854. 
 58. Id. at 1854 & n.111 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 62 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 57). 
 59. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988). 
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between the class of plaintiffs and class counsel, which would result 
in counsel making critical representative decisions without first 
consulting the class members. Potential conflicts of interest began to 
emerge between class members as disagreements occurred as to the 
manner in which to resolve their claims.
60
 As class members began to 
lose a greater amount of control over the litigation, greater 
opportunities began to arise for class counsel to collude with the 
defendants
61
 in settlement discussions in order to ensure the 
attorneys benefitted even when the class itself did not.  
 An additional abusive practice that became the subject of 
proposals for mass tort reform was the seemingly excessive fees 
plaintiffs’ attorneys were receiving, much of which were highly 
disproportionate to the recovery actually received by the class.
62
 In 
fact, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys realized they could recover 
higher fees for a representative lawsuit without having to exert the 
same amount of effort needed if the claims were individually 
resolved. Then, when such opportunistic lawyers discovered that 
state courts provided a more lenient forum in which to litigate, class 
action claims against large corporations increased by more than 
300% in federal courts and in excess of 1000% in state courts.
63
Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have been able to “game the system” for two primary 
reasons: the requirement of complete diversity and the amount-in-
controversy threshold.
64
 It is simple for the attorneys to add a named 
plaintiff simply because of his or her residency, and the Committee 
found that it “makes little sense” to require each claimant to show an 
individual claim of $75,000 when the cases frequently involve tens of 
millions of dollars.
65
 Furthermore, these attorneys began to 
frequently agree to settle the classes’ claims by accepting coupon 
settlements, which provide class members with low-value coupons to 
purchase the very products or services that were the basis of their 
initial claims, while still receiving significant monetary legal fees.
66
 Critics of class action litigation have also pointed out that the 
propensity for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file allegedly frivolous lawsuits 
and the potential for massive jury verdicts have generally been 
sufficient to force corporations into settling unfounded claims or 
deter otherwise honest corporations from expanding their 
operations.
67
 Certain states had become known as “judicial hellholes” 

 60. Purcell, supra note 5, at 1852-53. 
 61. Id.
 62. Id. at 1855. 
 63. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13-14. 
 64. Id. at 10. 
 65. Id.
 66. Sherman, supra note 3, at 1614. 
 67. Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000). 
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by corporate defendants, because the judges routinely certified 
classes of litigants when very few other jurisdictions would do so, and 
the juries were particularly unsympathetic to corporate defendants.
68
In particular, Madison County, Illinois admitted “that it applies ‘kind 
of a loose’ and ‘liberal’ policy in allowing out-of-state asbestos 
claimants to remain in the county[,] . . . routinely refus[ing] to 
dismiss or transfer such cases.”
69
 Courts in Madison County have 
been questioned for allowing “claims to proceed to trial where the 
plaintiff and defendant are located out-of-state, the plaintiff’s 
exposure occurred outside the state, medical treatment was provided 
outside the state, no witnesses live in Illinois, and no evidence 
relates to the state.”
70
 This mutation of class action claims along with a widespread 
increase in the abusive practices described above served as a catalyst 
for a renewed demand for mass tort reform. Additionally, the United 
States Chamber of Commerce and academic commentators 
attributed much of the abuse to state courts with a typically elected 
judiciary, which led to increased support for Congress to expand 
diversity jurisdiction in order to “provide a fairer and more impartial 
federal court forum for interstate class actions.”
71
 Amid much debate 
as to whether the motivation for the legislation was to increase 
protection for powerful corporations or to truly reform the system so 
that it may function in a fair and efficient manner, Congress’s 
decisive response was the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 
III.   OVERVIEW OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (CAFA) 
 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, frequent abuses of 
the class action process by overly aggressive attorneys and 
sympathetic state judges have “undermine[d] the national judicial 
system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of 
diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States 
Constitution.”
72
 In response, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
was passed. Its stated purposes are to 
 (1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with 
legitimate claims;  

 68. Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs’ Paradise Lost: Diversity of Citizenship and Amount 
in Controversy under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1025, 
1028 (2006). 
 69. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in 
Madison County, Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235, 245 (2004)). 
 70. Schwartz et al., supra note 69, at 245. 
 71. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should 
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call For Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction 
Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 510 (2000). 
 72. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). 
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 (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United States 
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of 
interstate cases of national importance under diversity 
jurisdiction; and
 (3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering 
consumer prices.
73
In accordance with these purposes, CAFA outlines fundamental 
changes that are intended to further these purposes. A highly 
significant change implemented by CAFA is the expansion of federal 
diversity jurisdiction to ensure that cases that truly effect interstate 
commerce can be litigated in a federal court. However, there are local 
controversy exceptions (referred to as carve-outs) that allow cases 
with certain characteristics to remain in state court.
74
 The procedure for removal was altered in a way that negated the 
ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to avoid federal jurisdiction by naming 
local defendants that have no true involvement in the claim or 
claiming damages less than the amount-in-controversy.
75
Additionally, appellate jurisdiction of remand decisions was 
modified.
76
 Finally, a Consumer Bill of Rights was created that 
requires an increased judicial scrutiny of coupon and net loss 
settlements, bars increased compensation for class members located 
near the court, and requires notice of proposed class settlements to 
state and federal officials prior to final approval.
77
 These reform 
efforts have effectively increased both the amount of class action 
lawsuits originally filed in federal district courts as well as the 
number of class actions that have been removed to federal court 
under diversity jurisdiction.
78
A.   Thwarting the “Judicial Hellholes” of State Courts by Expanding 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction 
 As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court had determined that 
in order for a class action to be litigated in a federal court, there must 
be complete diversity, requiring all named class representatives and 
all defendants to be citizens of different states.
79
 In addition, the 
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 73. Id.
 74. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 27; see also 
Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 1645, 1646-47 (2006). 
 75. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27. 
 76. Id. at 44. 
 77. Id. at 27. 
 78. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR. 1 (Apr. 2008), http://www.fjc.gov/ 
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf. 
 79. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921); Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). 
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claims of class members could not be aggregated,
80
 and at least one 
class member had to have claims exceeding $75,000. Together, these 
requirements made it extremely difficult for most class action 
lawsuits to fulfill the federal diversity jurisdictional requirements.
81
 However, CAFA amended the diversity statute in order to ensure 
that cases that should be litigated in a federal court actually get into 
federal court. This expansion was achieved by adding an additional 
provision, Subsection (d), which is specifically applicable to interstate 
class actions filed under FRCP 23 or comparable state statutes. The 
provision abrogates the requirement for complete diversity and 
removes the limit on aggregation of the monetary values of the 
claims.
82
 Now, federal courts have original jurisdiction if a class has 
at least 100 members (named or not), maintains citizenship that is 
diverse from any one defendant, and has claims exceeding $5 million 
in the aggregate.
83
 However, even when these requirements have been met, the 
federal district court must still ensure that the class action does not 
fulfill the elements established in the local controversy or home state 
controversy exceptions, otherwise known as carve-outs, before it may 
choose to exercise federal jurisdiction.
84
 In addition, defendants in 
actions that were initially filed in state court still have the right to 
remove the action to federal court if the action could have been 
originally filed in federal court.
85
B.   “Carve-outs” from Federal Jurisdiction: the Exceptions That 
Allow Class Actions to Remain in State Court 
 Although § 1332(d)(2) did significantly expand the scope of federal 




 80. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 
332, 338 (1969). 
 81. See Scott L. Nelson, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: An Analysis, 2005 ABA 
Annual Meeting 3-4 (Aug. 4-7, 2005), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/aba_cafa_analysis.pdf. 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) now reads as follows: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which 
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is a class action in which—  
  (A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from 
any defendant; 
  (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or 
subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or 
  (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any 
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. § 1441(a). 
 84. Id. § 1332(d)(3)-(4). 
 85. Id. § 1332(d)(2)-(5)(B). 
 86. Sherman, supra note 3, at 1596-97. 
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exceptions generally serve to ensure that certain types of cases 
remain in state court. There are both mandatory and permissive 
exceptions.
87
 The mandatory exceptions apply to class actions that 
involve either a local controversy or home state controversy. The 
permissive exception is based upon the discretion of the federal 
district court, although the court is provided with statutorily-
mandated criteria to utilize in its determination.
88
 The local controversy exception provides that a federal court must
decline jurisdiction if all of the following are met: (1) More than two-
thirds of the proposed class come from the state “in which the action 
was . . . filed”; (2) “[A]t least 1 defendant . . . from whom significant 
relief is sought” is from “the State in which the action was . . . filed” 
and that defendant’s “conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted”; (3) The “principal injuries . . . were incurred in the State in 
which the action was originally filed”; and (4) No other class action 
was filed within three years asserting the same allegations.
89
Additionally, under the home state controversy exception, a federal 
court must decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or more of the class 
members and primary defendants are from the state in which the 
action was filed.
90
 A federal district court may utilize the discretionary approach to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action if two elements are 
met. First, between one-third and two-thirds of all class members are 
citizens of the state in which the action was initially filed.
91
 Second, 
the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state.
92
 If both these 
elements are met, then the court may decline jurisdiction if it is “in 
the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the 
circumstances.”
93
 The court’s determination regarding the interests of 
justice and the totality of circumstances involves the application of a 
six-factor balancing test that measures the extent of the local nature 
of the controversy and the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
applying federal jurisdiction.
94
 Factor A questions whether the claims “involve matters of 
national or interstate interest.”
95
 If answered affirmatively, the court 
should feel more inclined to exercise federal jurisdiction. Factor B 
considers whether the law to be applied to the claims is that of the 

 87. See id. at 1596-1603. 
 88. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9-10 (2005). 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(II). 
 90. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
 91. Id. § 1332(d)(3). 
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. See id.
 95. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A). 
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initial forum or of various other states.
96
 The more local the law to be 
applied, the more likely it will be for the court to decline jurisdiction. 
Factor C questions whether the case was artfully pled to avoid 
federal jurisdiction, which is indicative of the drafters’ intent to 
thwart plaintiffs’ attorneys from doing this.
97
 If the complaint was 
artfully pled in a way to avoid federal jurisdiction, the court should 
feel more inclined to exercise federal jurisdiction.
98
 Factor D requires the court to look at any potential distinct nexus 
that may exist between the original forum state and the class 
members, alleged claims, or the defendants.
99
 Factor E examines 
whether there are substantially more class members that reside in 
states other than the forum state and if they are widely dispersed 
throughout these additional states.
100
 If the court finds that the 
members who are widely dispersed elsewhere outweigh the members 
in the forum, it is more of an interstate conflict and the court should 
choose to exercise federal jurisdiction.
101
 Lastly, Factor F questions 
whether a substantially similar claim or the same claim has been 
filed in the last three years, either by the same class members or 
others.
102
 If so, this would indicate a more widespread problem that 
should be handled by federal courts. There are several ambiguous 
aspects of each of these provisions governing when a federal court 
should, or may, choose to decline federal jurisdiction. They are 
further analyzed in Part IV. 
C.   Easing the Restrictions on Removal
 Prior to the passage of CAFA, there were specific restrictions that 
applied if a defendant desired to remove a case from state to federal 
court. First, a defendant could not remove a case if the defendant was 
a resident of the state in which the claim was originally filed.
103
Additionally, if there were multiple defendants, all the defendants 
had to consent to removal in order for it to be proper.
104
 Finally, 
Congress had issued an express, one-year time restriction on the 
removal of cases when the original jurisdiction would have been 
based on diversity, rather than a federal question.
105
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 96. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(B). 
 97. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(C). 
 98. Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1617, 1626 (2006).  
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(D). 
 100. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(E). 
 101. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 1602. 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(F). 
 103. Id. § 1441(b). 
 104. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
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 CAFA amended and essentially removed all three of these 
requirements, which had traditionally been barriers to federal 
jurisdiction for many class action cases. Now, the action may be 
removed “without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the 
State in which the action is brought,”
106
 which effectively undercuts 
the past practice of plaintiffs’ attorneys who frequently would name a 
plaintiff or defendant in the action in order to avoid diversity 
jurisdiction. The defendant may remove a case without the consent of 
other defendants.
107
 Additionally, the one-year time limitation on 
removal of claims based upon diversity jurisdiction is similarly no 
longer applicable.
108
D.   Reconsidering Remand Orders and Expanding the Power of 
Appellate Courts 
 Prior to CAFA, a litigant had very little recourse, if any at all, to 
challenge a decision regarding removal from state to federal court. If 
a federal district court had retained jurisdiction upon removal, the 
decision was not permitted to be reviewed until the entire case had 
been adjudicated.
109
 Moreover, if a federal court determined that 
removal was improper and remanded the case to state court, the 
remand order was barred from being reviewed on appeal.
110
 CAFA 
now provides access to appellate review. An order remanding a class 
action to state court may now be reviewed by appeal at the appellate 
court’s discretion.
111
 There are statutorily-mandated timeframes 
within which this review must take place. These timing elements are 
discussed in further detail in Part IV.
112
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 106. Id. § 1453(b). 
107. Id.
 108. See id.
 109. United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 750 (1946); Texas v. Real Parties in Interest, 
259 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548 
(5th Cir. 1981)).  
 110. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
 111. Id. § 1453(c). 
 112. See infra Part IV. The original text of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) read as follows: 
  (1) IN GENERAL.— Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under 
this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals 
may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a 
motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if 
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of 
the order.
  (2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.— If the court of appeals accepts an appeal 
under paragraph (1), the court shall complete all action on such appeal, 
including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date on which 
such appeal was filed, unless an extension is granted under paragraph (3). 
Id. (amended 2009).   
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IV.   INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS
A.   Statutory Interpretation as it has Developed and a Brief 
Comparison of the Purposivist and Textualist Approaches. 
 The field of statutory interpretation has substantially evolved 
from its early foundation of the Blackstonian vision of balancing law 
and equity into the modern legal process school that primarily 
focuses on statutory purpose.
113
 Judge Posner found Hart and Sacks’ 
legal process framework to be a good starting point, but felt that it 
needed a dose of reality.
114
 Additionally, Judge Posner felt that the 
methodology of economics needed to be applied to the democratic 
marketplace of the legislature because legislators were frequently not 
“reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably” and 
statutes frequently do not embody broad public policy purposes.
115
This realistic approach asserted that although statutes are 
frequently just the result of compromises made between lawmakers 
or special interest groups, if judges are given the discretion to 
completely disregard the statutory purpose, then there is the 
potential risk of attributing the judge’s conception of the public 
interest rather than the purposes one can reasonably infer from the 
actual legislation.
116
 Judge Posner advocated for the concept of 
“imaginative reconstruction,” which involves the judge attempting to 
put himself in the mindset of the enacting legislature, thus acting as 
the faithful agent of the enacting legislature by following the lines of 
the legislative compromise.
117
 However, Judge Easterbrook has consistently taken a more text-
based approach that “[j]udges . . . . carry out decisions they do not 
make.”
118
 This perception of the honest agent concept rejects the idea 
that a judge must reconstruct the mindset of the enacting legislature 
and instead imposes a duty of “clear statement” on the legislature.
119
In order to give proper deference to the legislature under the 
principle of separation of powers, Judge Easterbrook postured that 
“unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and 
revise a form of common law, the domain of the statute should be 
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 113. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48A:3 (7th ed. 2007). 
 114. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 819 (1983). 
 115. Id. at 819; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986). 
 116. Posner, supra note 114, at 819. 
 117. Id. at 817. 
 118. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60 (1984).  
 119. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-45 (1983) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).   
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restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved 
in the legislative process.”
120
 Judges should only apply the law to an 
area where the law is intended to apply, and the plain meaning 
should be interpreted within the scope of the statute.
121
 In 
determining the scope of the statute, “[i]f the question of a statute’s 
domain may not often be resolved by reference to actual design, it 
may never properly be resolved by reference to imputed design.”
122
 Perhaps the most well-known proponent of the textualism 
approach is Justice Scalia, whose plain meaning rule shares common 
characteristics with Judge Easterbrook’s clear statement principle. 
Justice Scalia has harshly criticized the Court’s past reliance on 
legislative history as an aid in interpreting statutes.
123
 Instead, he 
argues that the Court should rely in most cases on a statute’s plain 
meaning, which can be derived from an ordinary understanding of 
the words and structure of statutory text.
124
 “[C]ontext is everything” 
when interpreting a statute; one should consider the words in the 
statute,
125
 how a statute operates in the bill, the structure of the 
statute, the common usage of the grammar and syntax, and the 
dictionary meaning behind the words in a statute. Therefore, Justice 
Scalia will consult certain extrinsic sources beyond the statutory text. 
 Justice Scalia has firmly established his view that legislative 
intent is not, as many others argue, the dispositive key to statutory 
interpretation.
126
 His approach to statutory interpretation rests 
primarily on his perception of the structure of our government, 
particularly the separation of powers principle, which ensures that 
duties remain with the proper branch of government pursuant to the 
Constitution.
127
 Justice Scalia is a devout proponent of the concept 
that, based on the Constitutional provisions of bicameralism and 
presentment, the plain language of enacted legislation should be the 
controlling authority, because only the text is the law.
128
 Justice Scalia’s objection to the use of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation is partially based on his doubt that it holds 
true evidentiary value, because he does not consider legislative 
history to be sufficiently reliable.
129
 Yet another significant qualm 
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 120. Id. at 544. 
 121. Id. at 535-36. 
 122. Id. at 537. 
 123. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3, 22-23 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997).  
 124. See id. at 29-30. 
 125. See id. at 37. 
 126. Id. at 32-36. 
127. Id. at 35. 
 128. See id.
 129. See id. at 32-34. 
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that he has with its use is that judges cannot be trusted with 
absolute discretion to utilize this sort of material.
130
 Given the 
abundance of legislative history and the absence of a reliable way to 
infer actual legislative intent from those materials, he believes that 
judges will end up using legislative history selectively.
131
 Reliance on 
legislative history thus leads to judicial subjectivism.
132
 According to 
Justice Scalia, “ ‘[w]e use them [(committee reports)] when it is 
convenient, and ignore them when it is not,’ ”
133
 and it is “dangerous 
to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can 
prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies they 
favor” when relying on legislative history.
134
 In opposition to the textualist approach, there is another school of 
thought, purposivism, which has garnered a significant amount of 
support. Professor Farber, a well-known purposivist, would advocate 
for a more synthesized approach that incorporates the legislative 
history of CAFA to determine both the areas addressed in ambiguous 
terms, as well as those that were not addressed at all.
135
 As the name 
indicates, supporters of this type of interpretation believe that 
extrinsic sources must be consulted to ascertain the enacting 
legislature’s purpose. For instance, Professor Farber has asserted 
that the honest agent theory oversimplifies the agency model, 
because it does not take into account that agents act on their 
principals’ behalf rather than just robotically executing orders.
136
Additionally, he asserted that another flaw is that federal judges are 
not the agents of Congress but of the United States.
137
 Therefore, 
“their ultimate allegiance is to the Constitution,” and “it is the courts’ 
role to carry out congressional directives in light of their 
understanding of [those duties mandated by] the Constitution.”
138
Professor Farber also pointed out that although the supremacy 
principle does dictate that the judiciary must pay deference to the 
legislature, it does not automatically situate the judiciary in a 
subordinate position.
139
 Clearly, these approaches have significant differentiating 
characteristics and both have garnered praise and criticism. From 
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 130. See id. at 34. 
 131. Id. at 35-36. 
 132. Id.
 133. Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and 
the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 580 (1996) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 134. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 135. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
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 136. Id. at 284. 
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the Supreme Court to the lower courts, it is evident that judges have 
taken different approaches to comparable situations. This is evident 
from the way courts have addressed the ambiguous provisions of 
CAFA thus far. The resulting inconsistent applications of CAFA 
should motivate Congress to enact corrective legislation. 
B.   Applying Both Approaches to CAFA’s Silence on the Burden of 
Proof for Federal Jurisdiction and How Textualism Prevails 
 The question under CAFA of whether the burden of proving 
federal jurisdiction is on the removing party or on the party 
advocating for remand has incited the most significant amount of 
judicial interpretation concerns. CAFA does not contain a provision 
that explicitly changes the long-standing common law rule that the 
party seeking removal has the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. 
However, there were unequivocal and numerous references in the 
House Sponsors’ Statement and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report that indicated the drafter’s intent to shift the burden to the 
plaintiff objecting to removal to demonstrate that the jurisdictional 
requirements had not been met.
140
 The Chairman of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, Representative F. James 
Sensenbrenner, inserted the House Sponsors’ Statement into the 
congressional record, which read in part that “if a purported class 
action is removed under these jurisdictional provisions, the named 
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal 
was improper.”
141
 However, the House Sponsors’ Statement was not 
inserted into the congressional record until after CAFA had 
been enacted.
142
 Moreover, placing the burden on the party objecting to removal 
would be consistent with CAFA’s intent to broaden federal diversity 
jurisdiction, because a class action would presumptively remain in 
federal court unless the objecting party could make an affirmative 
showing that the case should be remanded.
143
 The Senate Report 
expressed a similar sentiment by including the following statement: 
If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these 
jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the 
burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., 
that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied). 
And if a federal court is uncertain about whether “all matters in 
controversy” in a purported class action “do not in the aggregate 

 140. 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42-
44 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40-42. 
 141. 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005). 
 142. Jeffrey L. Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdictional Burden 
of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2764 (2007). 
 143. Id. at 2763. 
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exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000,” the court should err in 
favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.
144
 Several federal courts have determined that there was a sufficient 
amount of legislative intent expressed in the legislative reports to 
justify abrogating the common law rule, thus requiring the party 
objecting to removal to bear the burden.
145
 These courts generally 
held that under CAFA, the burden of removal is on the party 
opposing removal to prove that remand is appropriate.
146
 This 
determination was based on the numerous statements made by the 
drafters by CAFA, along with the committee reports that 
accompanied the Senate bill, which those courts interpreted as 
indication of a desire to deviate from the common law rule. 
Furthermore, the court in Berry v. American Express Publishing 
Corporation held that this departure from common law tradition 
furthers the stated purpose of CAFA to expand the scope of federal 
diversity jurisdiction.
147
 Subsequent to these decisions, however, several appellate courts 
and federal district courts have been openly critical of the practice 
utilized by the earlier courts and labeled them as acting outside the 
bounds of judicial authority.
148
 For example, the Second Circuit 
pointed out that “it would be thoroughly unsound . . . to reject a 
longstanding rule absent an explicit directive from Congress. We 
presume that Congress, when it enacted CAFA, knew where the 
burden of proof had traditionally been placed. By its silence, we 

 144. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42. 
 145. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(maintaining that under CAFA, the party seeking remand bears burden of proof that 
federal jurisdiction does not exist); Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 
1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005) (determining that CAFA’s legislative history 
effectively shifted responsibility to prove the impropriety of removal on the party seeking 
remand); see also, e.g., Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that pre-CAFA diversity jurisdiction statute is void of language 
regarding allocation of burden of proof on remand). 
 146. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-23 (Holding that, with respect to CAFA, “the 
Committee Report expresses a clear intention to place the burden of removal on the party 
opposing removal to demonstrate that an interstate class action should be remanded to 
state court.” (emphasis added)). The court also noted that the report “states that ‘[i]t is the 
Committee’s intention with regard to each of these exceptions that the party opposing 
federal jurisdiction shall have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an 
exemption.’ ” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 44).  
 147. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. 
 148. DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that Congress’s silence regarding burden of proof failed to alter traditional 
rule); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the removing party continues to bear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction on 
remand motion and implicitly overruling district court decisions in Waitt and Berry); Brill 
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that none of 
CAFA's language “is even arguably relevant” to this burden-shifting argument); Moniz v. 
Bayer A.G., 447 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D. Mass. 2006) (rejecting proffered argument to shift 
burden of proof because Abrego Abrego implicitly overruled Natale).
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conclude that Congress chose not to alter that rule.”
149
 The Ninth 
Circuit additionally held that this silence regarding the burden issue 
creates a presumption that Congress was aware of the legal context 
in which it was legislating.
150
 The legal context at the time the 109th 
Congress passed CAFA into law featured a longstanding, near-
canonical rule that the burden on removal rested with the 
removing defendant.
151
 Had the drafters wanted the burden of proof to shift, they would 
have explicitly included such a provision within the text of CAFA so 
that it would be uniformly accepted by class action practitioners and 
uniformly applied by the judiciary. Courts should not now defer to 
the legislative history when, as Judge “Easterbrook argued[,] 
legislatures cannot have intents or purposes.”
152
 Legislatures “have 
‘only outcomes,’ not ‘intents’ or ‘designs.’ ”
153
 Furthermore, many courts and legal commentators have asserted 
that ambiguous language rather than mere silence in statutory text 
is required in order to resort to legislative history. The Ninth Circuit 
explained that the consideration of legislative history can only be 
appropriate where statutory language is ambiguous, because that is 
a necessary condition before interpretation should occur.
154
 Professor Eskridge advocates for a more active approach and has 
developed a unique precept of the legislative supremacy principle 
that involves three central themes: (1) “under any rigorous theory of 
statutory interpretation, legislative supremacy not only tolerates, but 
requires judges to” look beyond the statutory text and consider 
applicable situations “not contemplated by the original drafters”; (2) 
the assumptions upon which “the countermajoritarian difficulty with 
statutory interpretation” rest are generally controversial and may 
benefit from further questioning; and (3) the nature of interpretation 

 149. DiTolla, 469 F.3d at 275 (citation omitted). 
 150. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684; see, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 
696-97 (1979) (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like 
other citizens, know the law . . . .”); United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“Congress is, of course, presumed to know existing law pertinent to any new 
legislation it enacts.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 152. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252 (1992) (Easterbrook, supra note 119, 
at 547-48).   
 153. Id. at 253 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 119, at 547). 
 154. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683-84; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory 
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's 
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 
n.3 (1984) (“ ‘Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is 
inescapably ambiguous . . . .’ ”) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 
U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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outweighs the importance of legislative supremacy in order to create 
a bridge between the past and present meanings.
155
 Here, Professor 
Eskridge would apply his precept by looking beyond the silence in 
CAFA regarding the jurisdictional burden to examine the supporting 
documentation, make note of the stated intentions of the drafters to 
shift the burden, and likely conclude that the common law tradition 
had been usurped.  
 However, the numerous courts that have refused to abrogate the 
common law tradition regarding the burden of proof for removal 
proceedings do so pursuant to the canon of interpretation that 
“statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly 
construed.”
156
 Professor Shapiro explicates that this canon conforms 
to a desirable “judicial tendency to favor continuity over change.”
157
Additionally, his discussion regarding the merits of the canon posits 
that it should be viewed as “an analog to the more favorably viewed 
presumption against implied repeal of an existing statute.”
158
 This 
favorable view of the canon is especially valid in the context of such a 
long-standing common law tradition as the one allocating the burden 
of proof for removal, which has been utilized by practitioners and the 
judiciary for a countless number of years.  
 In his criticism of the general deference paid by courts to 
legislative history, Judge Easterbrook has explained: 
[W]hen the legislative history stands by itself, as a naked 
expression of “intent” unconnected to any enacted text, it has no 
more force than an opinion poll of legislators—less, really, as it 
speaks for fewer. Thirteen Senators signed this report and five 
voted not to send the proposal to the floor. Another 82 Senators did 
not express themselves on the question; likewise 435 Members of 
the House and one President kept their silence. . . .  
. . . [N]aked legislative history has no legal effect . . . . The rule 
that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk of non-
persuasion has been around for a long time. To change such a rule, 
Congress must enact a statute with the President’s signature (or 
by a two-thirds majority to override a veto). A declaration by 13 
Senators will not serve.
159
 Although both Professors Farber and Eskridge make valid points, 
Judge Easterbrook’s position exposes a flaw in the purposivist 
argument, which provided the basis for the decisions of the earlier 

 155. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319,  
322 (1989). 
 156. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (discussing the role that canons play in the process of  
statutory construction). 
 157. Id.
 158. Id. at 937. 
 159. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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judicially active courts. The purposivist approach may promote the 
advantages of using legislative history in statutory interpretation, but 
to rely on the statements included in the Senate Report would 
essentially allow the authority of an “opinion poll of legislators” to 
abrogate common law rule. Judge Easterbrook’s discussion makes it 
apparent that courts should continue to focus on the clear statement 
in the statutory text. Here, the text is silent. Thus, without an explicit 
statutory directive, it is reckless for the judiciary to take an active 
role; courts should continue to defer to the long-standing tradition of 
placing the burden on the party seeking federal jurisdiction.  
 However, the disparity between the statutory language of CAFA 
and the relevant legislative history does indicate a desire, by at least 
some members of Congress, to change this tradition. This significant 
ambiguity has resulted in differing judicial interpretations of the 
jurisdictional provisions.
160
 A corrective measure by Congress to 
specifically allocate the burden of proof would alleviate this dilemma. 
Courts would then be able to consistently apply and utilize CAFA’s 
provisions in order to further the stated purposes articulated 
by Congress. 
C.   Easing the Restrictions on Removal 
 Although CAFA did expand the scope of federal diversity, the 
carve-outs described in Part III allow certain types of class actions to 
remain in state court. Thresholds within the local controversy and 
home-state controversy exceptions either require or allow federal 
courts to decline exercising federal jurisdiction. Whether mandatory 
or permissive, there are ambiguous requirements, legal terms, and 
recommended criteria within all of the exceptions that have led to a 
significant amount of dispute and interpretation.  
 The most prominent example of an ambiguous legal term is the 
reference to “primary defendants” in both the statute governing 
mandatory abstention
161
 and the statute governing when a federal 
court is permitted to decline jurisdiction.
162
 The term primary 
defendant was not explicitly defined in CAFA. However, the 
legislative history describes the primary defendants as the “real 
‘targets’ of the lawsuit” (the individuals expected to incur the 

 160. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-23 (Holding that, with respect to CAFA, “the 
Committee Report expresses a clear intention to place the burden of removal on the party 
opposing removal to demonstrate that an interstate class action should be remanded to 
state court.” (emphasis added)). But see DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 
271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Congress’s silence regarding burden of proof failed 
to alter traditional rule). See also Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 
(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that none of CAFA's language “is even arguably relevant” to this 
burden-shifting argument). 
 161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2006). 
 162. Id. § 1332(d)(3). 
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majority of the loss) and as any defendant that would be liable to a 
majority of the class.
163
 Contrarily, there is nearly a complete dearth 
of information regarding the meaning of a “significant defendant.”  
 According to one legal commentator, there are four potential 
definitions of  
“primary defendant”: (1) a defendant against whom significant 
relief is sought; (2) a defendant whose alleged conduct forms a 
significant basis for the claims asserted; (3) a defendant 
characterized by both significant relief and significant culpable 
conduct . . . ; or (4) a defendant characterized by either significant 
relief or significant culpable conduct.
164
One court has found that a defendant was deemed primary when the 
whole class sought significant injunctive relief from him, even though 
he was a target of only one of eight plaintiffs’ claims.
165
 “The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines ‘primary’ as ‘[o]f the first or highest rank 
or importance,’ ” which implies that among many multiple defendants, 
there would be one who ranks as “primary” and all others would 
not.
166
 A modern textualist like Justice Scalia would be willing to 
consult such an objective resource in order to reach the most 
reasonable construction of the text.
167
 However, one district court has focused more on the defendant’s 
alleged conduct, rather than on whether the defendant is the one 
against whom the majority of the relief was sought, in determining 
the application of the term “primary defendant.”
168
 This court’s 
application of the term would fall within the second definition. The 
third definition, requiring both significant relief sought and direct 
liability, may result in no defendants being designated primary, 
which is not workable.
169
 The fourth definition appears to be a 
rational compromise, which allows the designation if either 
significant relief or direct liability is satisfied.
170
 The plain language of these provisions in CAFA does not provide 
much guidance for determining where the line is drawn between 
primary, significant, and the remaining defendants in a class action. 
Beyond the statutory text, there is no further instruction to be 

 163. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41; Vance, 
supra note 98, at 1623.  
 164. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1043-44. 
 165. Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. C 05-04558 WHA, 2006 WL 213834, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006). 
 166. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1042 (alteration in original) (quoting 12 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 167. See Scalia, supra note 123, at 23. 
 168. Adams v. Fed. Materials Co., No. Civ. A. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378, at *5 
(W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005). 
 169. Fredman, supra note 68, at 1047. 
 170. Id. at 1047-48. 
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garnered from the legislative history, which at least serves to 
alleviate a potential debate between textualists and purposivists 
regarding whether to utilize the legislative history. Regardless of the 
ambiguities that exist due to the legislative history, Judge 
Easterbrook correctly noted that “[w]e interpret texts. The invocation 
of disembodied purposes, reasons cut loose from language, is a sure 
way to frustrate rather than implement these texts.”
171
 Therefore, 
this area of CAFA would greatly benefit from a corrective measure by 
Congress to specifically delineate the requirements and thresholds 
for both a primary and significant defendant.  
D.   The Scrivener’s Error for Appellate Review of a Remand Decision 
That Congress Fixed Without Judicial Interpretation
 Another significant change to class action procedure effectuated 
by CAFA is its provision allowing for immediate review of 
jurisdictional decisions; more specifically, it changed the 
determination as to whether a case may be removed from state to 
federal court. When a decision is made to remove a case or to deny 
removal and remand the case to state court, CAFA authorizes review 
of the decision, but only “if application is made to the court of appeals 
not less than 7 days after entry of the order.”
172
 The wording of this 
requisite time limit resulted in a significant amount of controversy 
and litigation. There is an unprecedented amount of legislative 
history that indicates the drafters of CAFA intended for there to be a 
seven-day deadline to promote judicial efficiency, rather than the 
seven-day waiting period, which resulted from the language that was 
actually enacted.
173
 For instance, when CAFA was being considered by the Senate 
Committee, a report was issued describing the reasoning for allowing 

 171. Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added) (amended 2009). The actual text of 
this provision as originally enacted was as follows: 
(c) REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this 
section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may 
accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion 
to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if 
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of 
the order.
(2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.—If the court of appeals accepts an appeal 
under paragraph (1), the court shall complete all action on such appeal, 
including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date on which 
such appeal was filed, unless an extension is granted under paragraph (3). 
Id. § 1453(c)(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
 173. Adam N. Steinman, “Less” is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better 
Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1183, 1212-13 (2007).
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appellate review of removal decisions. It was noted that one purpose 
of the provision was “ ‘to develop a body of appellate law interpreting 
[CAFA] without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions.’ ”
174
The Committee went on to describe the imposition of time limits on 
such review. In fact, the report stipulated that the “ ‘[n]ew subsection 
1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review [of remand orders 
under this legislation] but also imposes time limits. Specifically, 
parties must file a notice of appeal within seven days after entry of a 
remand order.”
175
 Additionally, the appeals court shall issue a final 
decision on the appeal within 60 days.
176
 However, if the parties 
agree, they may extend the time limit; or the court may, on its own, 
grant an extension of no more than ten days.
177
 Courts differed on how to apply the actual provision allowing for 
appeals when the application to review was made “not less than 
seven days after entry of the order.”
178
 The Tenth Circuit was the 
first court to deal with the issue of how to interpret the “not less than
7 days.”
179
 After reviewing the Senate Report that explicitly stated 
the drafters intended to impose a seven-day limit on applications for 
review, the court concluded that the seven-day provision was a 
scrivener’s error and the provision was intended to impose a seven-
day deadline rather than the waiting period as written.
180
 This 
holding completely went against the plain text of the statute, 
although Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit reasoned that such a 
deviation was permissible in situations where a “ ‘literal application 
of the statute [would] produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters.’ ”
181
 The Eleventh Circuit also adopted the same approach as the 
Tenth Circuit by finding that a literal reading of CAFA’s appellate 
provision “ ‘would produce an absurd result.’ ”
182
 The Third Circuit in  
Morgan v. Gay also concurred with the decision in Pritchett by 
referring to the legislative history and determining that to rule that 
the provision required a seven-day waiting period would, in fact, 
allow the parties to potentially abuse the system by strategically 
waiting to appeal the remand decision and delay the case for a 
greater amount of time than necessary.
183
 The Ninth Circuit agreed 

 174. Id. at 1195 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46). 
 175. Id. at 1195 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49). 
 176. § 1453(c)(2). 
 177. Id. § 1453(c)(3). 
 178. Steinman, supra 173, at 1196.  
 179. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 180. Id. at 1093 n.2.  
 181. Id. at 1093 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)). 
 182. Steinman, supra note 173, at 1199 (quoting Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 
1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 183. Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
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with this approach although a large number of dissenters to the sua
sponte call for en banc rehearing of the case argued that the 
“scrivener’s error” exception should not have applied in that case.
184
Those on the panel who advocated a correctionist approach did 
concede they were not taking part in interpretation per se, but rather 
were replacing terms in the statutory text altogether in order to 
comport with the legislative intent and ensure that otherwise absurd 
results did not occur.
185
 The dissenters on the Ninth Circuit wrote a lengthy criticism of 
the stance taken by those correctionists who chose to ignore “the 
supremacy of the legislature.”
186
 Specifically, Judge Bybee stated that 
the panel chose to ignore the plain meaning of the text in order to 
substitute legislative history, which was an abuse of “judicial power,” 
and that interpretative aids should not be utilized when the language 
is plain and ambiguous as was CAFA’s provision outlining a 
timeframe for appeals.
187
 Judge Bybee was additionally concerned 
about this practice, because such a sharp deviation from the 
language of the law would essentially result in depriving citizens of 
knowing the law on which they may rely in conducting their affairs 
so that they will not engage in unlawful conduct.
188
 Although Judge 
Bybee and others—who have advocated strict adherence to the plain 
text of the CAFA provision
189
—provided a valid basis for their 
approach, even strict textualists, such as Justice Scalia, permit 
interpretation to a certain extent by applying the absurdity doctrine 
or scrivener’s error exceptions in rare circumstances similar to that 
which resulted from applying the CAFA provision as it was written.
190
 In 2009, Congress responded to the controversy, conflicting 
judicial decisions, and criticism by academic legal commentators by 
amending this provision.
191
 The 2009 amendment struck out “not less 
than 7 days” and inserted “not more than 10 days”
 192
 to fully comport 
with the legislative history that had indicated an intent to limit 
applications for review to a short period of time. This puts to rest the 
issue of which interpretative method to utilize in order to effectively 

 184. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 
1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 185. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 
F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 448 F.3d 1092. 
 186. Amalgamated, 448 F.3d at 1099 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 1094-96. 
 188. Id. at 1100. 
 189. Id. at 1095-96. 
 190. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 145-46 (2009) (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
 191. Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16, § 
6(2), 123 Stat. 1607, 1608.  
 192. Id.
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apply this time limit and demonstrates that courts do not need to 
look beyond the text interpreting a statute, because Congress can 
uniformly resolve an ambiguity with a corrective amendment. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 In order for courts to fulfill Congress’s stated purposes behind the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 of fairness and efficiency, they 
need to receive proper guidance through clear and unambiguous 
statutory language. Although it may be impossible to conceive of a 
legislative reform of this magnitude without ambiguities arising, 
there are corrective measures that should be taken by Congress to 
provide greater clarity. These include amending the diversity 
jurisdiction statute to specifically place the burden of proof for federal 
diversity jurisdiction on either the removing party or the party 
seeking remand to state court. Furthermore, the terminology utilized 
in the exceptions to the expansion of federal jurisdiction, specifically 
the references to primary defendants, should be legislatively 
clarified. Finally, courts must be provided with definitive criteria 
regarding their duty in determining whether a settlement is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate,” along with what the term “coupon” 
encompasses in order to comply with CAFA’s intent to prevent the 
abusive practices of unscrupulous attorneys. Beyond these areas of 
ambiguity that require legislative clarification, CAFA has been 
moderately successful thus far in expanding federal diversity 
jurisdiction in an effort to make class action litigation more 
consistent, equitable, and efficient. 
